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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE

THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND
WESTERN EUROPE
I. INTRODUCTORY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this
statement to the Senate is i"l the nature

of a summary of my impressions of reactions in Western Europe to the administration's new economic program. In due
course, I shall file with the Committee on
Foreign Relations a formal report on
this s'..lbject. The observations which I
make now and others which will be contained in my subsequent report flow
from a recent visit to various European
states and, briefly, to Morocco. Some of
these states are members of the European
Economic Community and others are
on the VE'rge of membership. All of them
are affected directly or indirectly by the
new economic policy.
I held direct exchanges with U.S. Embassy personnel and government leaders
in seven countries. These conversations
were supplemented, under my direction,
by staff reports from still other areas.
The journey culminated in Paris at the
59th Interparliamentary Union which I
attended for 2 days. The focus of the
study was the new economic program although in Morocco and elsewhere other
subjects were raised. In Paris, I made
it a point to eschew discussions of Vietnam with the various delegations to the
Paris Peace Conference.
My principal concern was to weigh
European reactions to the new economic
program for communication to the Senate. Wherever I went, however, I also
took occasion to emphasize to European
leaders the urgency of the economic
problems at home which had led to the
promulgation of the program. I pressed
for their understanding of our situation
even as the people of the United States
have shown understanding to theirs on
many occasions in the past. Invariably
these exchanges were frank and friendly
and, at the same time, reassuring of the
continuance of a high degree of mutual
consideration between Western Europe
and the United States.
II. EUROPEAN kEACTIONS TO THE NEW
ECONOMIC PROGRAM

The European nations have been aware
of the economic difficulties which have
been gathering for the past several years
in the United States. They have watched
the unchecked inflation, the persistent
high level of unemployment, and the
shifting trade flow with deep interest and
concern. Indeed, a number of major
European countries have long been pressing the United States to take strong
measures to correct its payments deficits.
The alarms which had been rung in
the Senate and elsewhere had reached
Europe: Closer at hand, European governments also had evidence of the ineffectiveness of the initial remedies for
this Nation's difficulties. European central banks were witness to gyrations in
gold prices, periodic speculative rushes of
dollars from one currency to another and
other manipulations in the European
financial markets.
Notwithstanding these· harbingers, the
first reaction to the new economic pro-
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gram was one of stunned surprise. European nations groped for a proper response to the administration's new course
and for new footholds for their monetary
policies. Under EEC leadership, an effort
was made to find a common European
approach. It was not successful, largely
in consequence of the great divergencies
between the positions of France and
Germany. For the present, therefore, the
European nations are acting individually
and with a variety of responses. All of
the reactions, however, to one degree or
another, involve some degree of free
market determination of the present
value of the dollar. Nor are the forthcoming monetary conferences expected
to make much difference in the situation.
There was a certain inevitability in the
initial European shock. The administration's course was a drastic change in direction which for three decades, had assigned to a stable dollar-gold relationship
the central role in the commerce of the
North Atlantic nations and much of the
rest of the world. Moreover, the impact
was intensified by the suddenness of the
announcement as well as hy the nature
of certain of the specific remedies which
the administration chose to pursue.
The first wave of reaction has now
passed. In a calmer aftermath the Europeans tend to acknowledge that the need
to shore up this Nation's financial position was long past due. If there ever was
any tendency to gloat over our economic
difficulties, as some earlier press reports
indicated, it has long since passed. The
fact is, that the European stake in the
outcome of the President's program is
very great. The stability of the U.S. economy still lies at the base of North Atlantic
commercial relationships. In turn, the
well-being of all of Western Europe is
still intimately woven into those relationships.
That the European governments are
understanding does not mean that they
concur in every aspect of the administration's new program. On the contrary,
they are articulate in setting forth differences. Certain European nations, for example, would have preferred that the
currency readjustments take the form of
a revaluation in the price of gold rather
than the suspension of the relationship
between the metal and the dollar. The
preference for what might be termed gold
levitation over dollar floatation is not
too ditncult to understand. As the Europeans see it, a rise in the fixed price of
gold would not only have forestalled the
necessity for revaluations of their currencies but it would also have increased
greatly European exchange reserves
which are now held extensively in gold.
There is· also concern that the proposed investment-tax credit is to apply
exclusively to purchases of U.S. origin.
From the point of view of European selfinterest, a tax incentive for U.S. industries to "buy American" can only serve
to reduce the competitive effectiveness of
many European manufacturers-notably
of machinery-in the U.S. market. The
proposed repeal of the excise tax on automobiles is similarly regarded as a blow on
a blow to European exports in most of
those nations which are heavily committed to the sale of vehicles in the U.S.
market.

m.

THE TEMPORARY IO•PERCENT ADDITIONAL
IMPORT DUTY

The most universal reaction to the new
economic program, however, is reserved
for the general 10-percent add-on, or
surcharge, with regard to U.S. import
duties. All of the European governments
oppose the provision although certain
countries are hit more directly and painfully than others. Recession and unemployment are now anticipated among
certain European exporters of highly
competitive commodities such as shoes,
jewelry, and watches. On the whole,
however, the European economies do
have alternative sources of trading
strength-notably the inner market of
the European Economic Community and
they appear sufficiently stable to be able
to absorb the increase in duty without
widespread disruption.
There is little disposition to challenge
this increase under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Nor is there
any inclination to engage in or to threaten reprisals. The fact is that there are
unchallenged European precedents for
the action which has now been taken by
the United States.
Objections to the increase in duty are
expressed largely on philosophical
grounds. It is described as a step back
from freer international trade which, to
call a spade a spade, is what it is even
on a temporary basis. As noted, however,
it is not the first happening of that kind
in the Western trading community. Other nations have made similar retrogressions. That the step now looms as a giant
one in European eyes is because it has
been taken by the largest nation and
over the past several decades one of the
most consistent advocates of freer trade.
Hence, great stress is laid on the "temporary" tag which has been attached to
the provision. The word is, at once, both
reassuring and disturbing in Europe. On
the one hand, the Europeans find themselves able to adjust to a "temporary" increase and they can· also appreciate that
a "temporary" lapse in the economic philosophy which has fueld U.S. trade policy
for decades need not be permanently disruptive of the economic relationships in
which they have invested so heavily. On
the other hand what troubles them is the
possibility that "temporary" may become
permanent. The fact is that the Europeans are far more heavily dependent on
international trade than is the United
States.
In the circumstances, the question
weighs heavily; what if the add-on is
only the opening breech? The European
nations do not dismiss the possibility
that the breech may be widened by subsequent unilateral U.S. measures should
the new economic p'rogram prove inadequate ip. showing us the way out of the
economic doldrums. The President has
taken the lead in offering the reassurances of his administration on that score.
During the course of my visit I emphasized that both the administration and
the Congress were not predisposed to retreat to the d~s of Smoot-Hawley and
the Great Depression. There is no gainsaying the fact, however, that a doubt
persists in Europe as to our 'course in
the future. The fear is real.
If developments were to bear out this
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fear of further restrictive measures, the
consequences would be portentous for
both Europe and the United States. For
two decades, the people of both regions
have profited greatly from a vigorous economic interflow. The growing movement
of goods and capital and, increasingly,
skills and people across national borders
has done much to raise living levels and
enrich the mutual human experiences of
Europeans and Americans.
A reversal of that pattern on a temporary basis may have been unavoidable
but it is nonetheless regrettable. Should
there be further retrogression, the most
serious damage could be done to the wellbeing of both the European nations and
the United States. In the end, both might
well be cut loose from the moorings of a
commonly sustained stability which has
contributed so much to the evolution of
peace in Europe and the North Atlantic.
In the circumstances, too much stress
cannot be laid on the significance of the
word "temporary" as it is applied to the
increase in duty. The increase in the
import duty is, at best, an awkward and
dubious remedy for the Nation's economic difficulties. It does not combat inflationary pressures; it accommodates to
them and, hence, contributes to higher
prices at home. It serves as a relief for
inefficiency rather than as an incentive
to more efficient production. To be sure,
the add-on may provide a breather for
the dollar abroad but, in any durable
sense, it will do nothing to pump new
breath into the international financial
position of the United States.
IV.

NATO

AND

THE NEW

ECONOMIC

PROGRAM

A more pointed correction of the weakness in that position would involve ending excessive governmental expenditures
and especially those which are made in
other nations. Many of these expenditures seem to persist out of resistance to
change rather than out of any significant
relationship to the Nation's current needs
or interests.
It is only too obvious, for example,
what damage has been done to the Nation's economic position by an outflow
in the range of $130 billions of dollars for
the tragic and wasting war in Indochina.
Yet the war goes on; so, too, do the
expenditures, not to speak of the tragic
waste of life and resources.
On a smaller scale, the ex'pense of
military bases abroad and of foreign aid
illustrates the same point. With regard
to the latter, year in and year out, billions have poured abroad. In many eases,
constructive results have been scarcely
perceptable and, sometimes, as in the
India-Pakistan situation, the consequences have been downright deplorable.
Yet the indiscriminate outflow for aid
continues and · even spreads further
afield.
The cut of 10 percent in aid which has
been proposed this year by the administration is to be welcomed even though
it seems to me that it is far too meager.
Moreover, no distinction is drawn in the
proposed cut between what might be
constructive and what is ineffective or
worse in aid.
For the PWi><>Ses of this report, the
most pertinent example of the kind of
excessive government expenditure which
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tends to erode the financial position of may be that this mood derives from a
the United States is the outlay for NATO dangerously deceptive sense of security.
at the present level. Clearly, the billions It may be that the NATO command is
which are spent every year, directly and still well-advised to think and plan in
indirectly, for this enterprise bear a terms of imminent military conftict besignificant relationship to the weakness tween East and West. That is not, howocf the dollar abroad. In my judgment, ever, the contemporary idiom of either
these expenditures come from the hand peoples or governments on the European
of an outdated policy. It is a heavy hand continent. Quite the contrary, the talk
which, fixed on the Treasury, diminishes in Europe is of peace and so is the action.
the capability of the United States for Words of reconciliation flow across the
dealing with contemmrary economic line of separation accompanied by accelerating trade, technological exchange,
realities.
That 1s not to say that expenditures and travel. Indeed, Communist workers
for NATO should be eschewed for rea- from the East form a part of this flow
sons of economy if they are required to as they move on contract into labormeet urgent securtty needs in accord- short Western Europe even as European
ance with the North Atlantic Treaty. private enterprise operates in Eastern
However, there is nothing in that treaty Europe.
which constitutes a commitment to make
The detente has been gaining moexpenditures at the present level. The mentum in Europe for several years. Even
phrase "at the present level" is em- the Czechoslovakian intervention.in 1968
phasized because what we do 1n the way slowed it only momentarily. Now it is
of contribution to NATO is the conse- extending rapidly from the cultural and
quence of our own national decision. economic realms into the political. The
Consultation with NATO allies may be SALT talks, for example, were reported
desirable but the question of a reduction to me in Helsinki as making very good
in U.S. Forces from their present level, progress. I spent a whole day going over
however, is not one of international con- the progress being made. Moreover, while
sent but of unilateral determination.
I was in Europe, an agreement was
This question was reviewed by the reached by the Soviet Union, the United
Senate a few months ago and a cut States, France, and the United Kingdom
in the U.S. contingency in Europe on which is designed to defuse the Berlin
the basis of legislative initiative was re- situation-incidentally, President Nixon
jected at that time. However, the fact played a very significant and important
that the administration has now found part in this-Germans of East and West
it necessary to resort to urgent economic are now engaged in itemizing this accord.
salvage operations underscores the nec- Thereafter should come the formalizing
essity for further consideration of this of the Soviet-West German and Polishquestion. It is to be hoped that a cut West German pacts which have already
might now be brought about by Execu- been negotiated and which will settle, for
tive action. If it is not, the question of a all practical purposes, the border queslegislative initiative may be raised once tions carried over from World War II.
again 1n the Senate this session.
To be sure, the unexpected could interV. OBSERVATIONS ON NATO
vene to rewrite this diplomatic scenario.
For the present, however, I would only For the present, however, developments
set forth certain observations on the in Europe underscore the antiquation of
status of NATO which derive from my NATO in its present form. That is not
recent study abroad. It seems to me to deprecate its past contribution nor the
continuing value of the Western Alliance
thatFirst. The Western European nations in order to meet unforeseen contingenremain firmly wedded to joint defense cies. The problem is not with the desiraof the West under the North Atlantic bility of the North Atlantic Treaty; it is
Treaty. May I add, it is my hope that desirable and, perhaps, vital to all consuch will also be the case with regard cerned. The problem, rather, is the form
to the policies of the United States be- and content of a NATO two decades old.
cause the mutual stake in the North Despite its so-called policy of "flexible
response," NATO has remained rigid in
Atlantic Treaty is very high.
Second. When it comes to material its design for conventional warfare even
support of NATO, the European nations as the confrontation which might give
are prepared to urge the United States rise to that warfare has been receding
not to make reductions in its contribu- for many years. Moveover, NATO has
tion. There is no indication, however, continued to be overstaffed, overmanned,
that any NATO nation is ready to make and overfinanced by the United States
a substantial increase in its support of long after the Western Europeans have
NATO. On the contrary, it is not far- gained the capacity to play the preponfetched to anticipate further reductions derant part in whatever conventional dein the present European effort under the fense they may deem necessary for their
organization. Even now what the West- security.
ern Europeans are doing in the name
In the circumstances, NATO engages in
of NATO probably differs very little from exercises designed for an era of cold war
what they would be doing, in any event, while the climate in Europe warms to the
for their national defense establishments prospect of an all-European peace settlein the absence of NATO.
ment. In the circumstances, an enormous
Third. The reluctance of the Euro- effort in manpower and funds disappears
pean nations to take over any major part from the coffers of the United States, at
of the heavy U.S. burden in NATO is the expense of the national economy and
part and parcel of the present mood of the international strength of the dollar.
Europe. The mood is one of detente and All the while, Europe uses its resources
peace not of confrontation and war. It more pointedly for the economic well-
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being and progress of its people. This
situation highlights the need, in my judgment, to face up to the anachronism of
the current consignment of U.S. military
forces in Europe. The presence of over
half a million American servicemen and
dependents in Europe is irrelevant to
the political situation on the continent.
The great cost of maintaining the consignment is damaging to this Nation's
interests both in Europe and at home.
VI. 1-!"'fDICATED CHANCES IN NATO POLICIES

With or without mutual force reductions, it seems to me highly necessary
that there be a substantial and graduated reduction in U.S. forces in Europe.
Indeed, what value in any negotiations is
the debilitating waste of our financial
resources? To follow the line of reasoning that suggests we should keep U.S.
forces in Europe in order to increase our
bargaining power with the Soviet Union
is to argue that if the present forces were
doubled in size our bargruning power
would be doubled.
It should be noted that there have been
some administrative reductions in U.S.
force levels in NATO below the maximum of several years ago. However welcome, these limited economies are not to
be confused with the financial benefit oo
the Nation which could be derived from
an updating of the policies which govern
present troop-numbers in Europe. A realistic reading of the current situation, in
my; judgment, indicates possible changes
which should contribute effectively to the
recovery of the Nation's financial health
without in any way impairing its security. Specifically, the following measures may be practicable:
First. A reduction in the U.S. military
contingent in Western Europe on a graduated basis within the near future. The
critical factor in maintaining the North
Atlantic Treaty in present circumstances
is not the size of the U.S. military contingent but the reliability of the total
U.S. commitment. In my judgment, two
divisions or less of U.S. forces would be
as effective in the latter connection as
four or more.
Second. A substantial cut in U.S. command participation in NATO. It would
seem most appropriate, in particular,
that a European be designated as the
next Commander in Chief of the organization and for the United States to take
the initiative in encouraging such a selection.
Third. A substitution of multinaval
NATO forces in the Mediterranean for
the conspicuous and overwhelming presence of the 6th Fleet.
.
Fourth. A development of effective
techniques for keeping alive the vital concept of the N~rth Atlantic Treaty while
at the same time NATO, as it presently
exists, is cut to streamlined essentials,
ready for prompt remobilization in the
event of emergencies. If present political
trends in Europe continue, this conversion of NATO to standby status might
well be possible within 5 years.
Vll. ADJUSTMENTS IN U ..S . OOLICY AND
AOMINIST!lA TION

As already noted, the trends in Europe
are toward detente. In this Nation's economic interest, and in the interest of
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maintaining a constructive diplomatic
role in the evolution of peace in Europe,
we should adjust our policies, in all respects, to those trends and do whatever
we can to encourage them. To that end,
it seems to me thatFirst. All parts of the Federal machinery, involving the administration of
U.S. policies regarding Europe should be
reexamined by the President and the appropriate congressional committees in
order to update procedures which may
be still out of harmony with present
trends.
Second. Our policies with regard to
Germany should be redesigned to stabilize the existing situation. To that end,
these policies should accept the permanence of the two Germanies for the foreseeable future and encourage peaceful
and developing contacts between them.
They should provide affirmative support
for ratification of the West German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact and for the
West German-Soviet Union Non-Aggression Pact.
Third. Finally, our policies should endorse, without reluctance, an all-European choosing for the purpose of seeking
among other things, a non-aggression
treaty between the NATO and Warsaw
Pact nations. And this meeting should be
attended by both Canada and the United
States.
Vm. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

To give the direction which has been
outlined to U.S. policy, as I see it, would
be to point it by the compass of the
Nixon doctrine. It would be a direction
in accord with the mood in Europe, in
accord with the Nation's domestic and
international economic interests, and in
accord with the needs of a stable peace.
Europe may well be at a most decisive
moment in intra-European relations and
in relations with the United States. It is
a moment which contains promise along
with pitfalls. It would be tragic if we
were to turn away from this moment
which may olfer us an opportunity to
cement the peace of Europe either because of a delayed and faulty reaction to
the financial difficulties of years of diplomatic and military overextension or because a topheavy and aging machinery
for the conduct of our European policy
continues to flail at the ghosts of the
past.
If we fail to grasp this moment, the
posSibilities loom large for the rapid
growth of economic sniping and intrigue.
From that point, it is a short distance to
a militant economic nationalism and
blocism and the crumbling of Western
political unity in a general fit of recrimination and reprisals.
There need not be this slide in the
Western community into what, in the
end, may well be self-destructive. It
should be possible to move out of that
era which since World War II has had
the United States at the core of responsibility and burden without these consequences. We should be able to move into
a new and fruitful age of mutuality with
Western Europe, within a peaceful Europe, if we will set aside the fears of the
past and act in timely fashion on the
facts of the present.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order the Senator from South Carolina <Mr. HoLLINGS)
is recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I yield
at this time to the distinguished Senator
from Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
wish to join with the Senator from Montana and express my agreement with
what he has just said. I think what he
has. said has been dramatically highlighted and fortified by the articles which
have recently been published in the
Washington Post with respect to our
Army in Europe.
I would hope that the Senator from
Montana would and I urge him again to
olfer his well-directed and well-known
amendment for the reduction of our
troops in Western Europe.
I congratulate the Senator on his preliminary report, and I agree that it is
high time in our own interest to reduce
our presenc~ there and approve of these
valious moves that have taken place.
I certainly agree with the Senator from
Montana and I congratulate him on a
very fine statement.
I wish to ask the Senator a question.
I ask the Senator, in view of his observations and the reports on the military regarding the demora.lizin.g elfect on our
troops in occupation, if it would not perhaps be proper to again raise this ques~
tion for a vote in the Senate?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would agree with
the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and I wish
to say to him that it is my intention to
do so at an appropriate time in connection with an appropriate bill. There are
a number of measures to which the
amendment seeking to bring about a substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Western Europe on a graduaJted basis could
be attached.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I hope the Senator
will do so. To me the reports coming out
about the demoralization of our forces
are absolutely horrible. I can think of
nothing more serious with regard to our
own military defenses and, in addition to
that, to our reputation, to our influence
generally in Europe and over the world.
I hope the Senator will do so. I assure the
Senator my support and I think he has
a great deal of other support. I thank the
Senator for his report.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have inserted in
the RECORD the three articles by Haynes
Johnson and George Wilson, which were
published in the Washington Post over
the past 3 days. If everyone will take the
time to read them the articles will be
found to be eye-opening. I am disturbed
at the lack of morale of our troops in
Europe. I am disturbed greatly about the
drug traffic, the crime increase, and the
shabby conditions under which our enlisted men live, and I emphasize the.
word "enlisted." I think something
should be done because what I want
there is an effective and lean army and
not the kind of army we have there at
the present time, which I think is fa.r
from lean. It is quite to the contrary.
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Certainly, in view of the race problem,
the drug problem, the Clime problem
and the slackness of morale, it is not effi~
cient at this time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield to the Senator
from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
would also congratulate the distinguished majority leader for one of his
typically wise and constructive observations to the Senate, this one based on his
recent trip.
On the floor of the Senate it has been
stated and restated that we have over
7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe. With
that type and character of defense in
Europe it still seems incredible to me
that we have to continue to keep these
hundreds of thousands of our conventional military over there. Surely these
countries can handle more of this problem of military bodies.
I would Join the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in hoping
that, as soon as he considers it proper, the
majority leader will again introduce the
resolution for a reduction of our troops
in Europe.
A prominent physician only this morning told me that once a person is really
"hooked"-that was his expression--on
heroin, there is no out from his standpoint except suicide.
In reading these three articles referred
to it would seem that the Army, not contributing in a real sense, is creating the
probability of additional Atticas. Regardless of who is wrong or right in the
dreadful situation that developed in that
town in the State of New York-a sad
business, il~deed-all this is something in
which every American as well as every
¥ember of the Senate should be, and I
am sure is, deeply interested.
Putting it mildly, the drug problem in
the most recent article in question was
verified to Senator PASTORE and me by
officers and enlisted men of the Army
when we visited Europe last April.
I would hope, therefore, again inasmuch as I believe in Germany we a.re
creating additional Atticas, that we
would look further into these articles entitled "Army in Anguish," published in
the Was}11ngton Post and written by two
responsible newspapermen.
With that in mind I have requested
the chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services to establish a. subcommittee to investigate thoroughly the allegations in these articles. It is about
time, from the standpoint of our military
posture, that we begin to look at the
vital problem of morale in the SeTVices,
a characteristic of military preparedness that is just as important as any
weapons system or group of weapons
systems.
So again I congratulate the distinguished majority leader for the thoughtful position he has presented this morning.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish
to thank the distinguished Senator and
to say that I believe we have to have an
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army based not on numbers but effectiveness. There is a job to be done in rebuilding the Army, and I am sure the
Congress as a whole stands ready and
willing to participate in that effort,
which must be undertaken for the security of the United States.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, of
course, I agree. We should have a mighty
fine Army. I would hope this matter
could be cleared up, not only in the
Armed Services Committee but also, from
the standpoint of commitment, in the
Foreign Relations Committee, of which
the majority leader is a member.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President,. will the
Senator from South Car&lina yield to me
without losing his right to the ftoor?
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I am
glad to yield to the Senator from
Vermont.
J
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, the remarks
of the majority leader, the Senator from
Montana, are very timely and should be
heeded and will be heeded, not only in
this body but in the rest of the country as
a whole.
I was at home on August 15 when the
President made . his unexpected and
startling announcement relative to our
national economy and the action he proposed to take. I think that, with very
few exceptions the President's statement
and proposed plan were very well received even by those who disagree with
him on many, many other things. But
there Is also a feeling that this statement must be followed up by action
without much delay. That action must
not be a party issue, it must not be an
issue between the Congress and the
White House, it must not be an Issue between industry and labor, because the
stakes are too high and the situation is
too serious to indulge in that kind of
pla.y.
It was only natural that other countries showed resentment at this statement. It came unexpectedly. They were
surprised. Many of them thought it was
dir~ted at them, so they were not very
happy. They do not feel very happy at
having anyone in authority in the United
States telling them how much they
should revalue their own currency, which
runs from 15 percent in Japan down to
r.lmost nothing in some of the other
countries. But these other countries
have a share in this responsibility themselves. They forced the President to take
the action he did, in a way. They have
In the past subsidized their own products
through dumping them on the rest of the
world, particularly the United States.
They have made internal restrictions
against products imported from the
United States which have been very
costly to us and are largely responsible
for the imbalance of our economic situation. Many of th~m have failed to observe the mandates of the United Nations while expecting the United States
to fully observe those mandates.
Finally, I think Western Europe has
to bear a great deal of the responsibility
for forcing the hand of the President in
doing what he did, because the time has
now come, as the Senator from Montana
has said, for Western Europe to assume
the responsibility for their own defenses.

agree with him that the next commander of the NATO forces should be
a European.
The situation now calls for consultation and cooperation, not confrontation.
There can be no delay if the damaging
conditions of the 1930's are to be
avoided, because what hurts the United
States hurts these other countries as
well, and even more. Reverting to fortress America is not in the interest of the
United States. It could be popular at
first. It is not in the interest of the rest
of the world.
I am very, very hopeful that all nations, we share responsibility too, for the
present situation and threatening situation in the world will be able to sit down
together and work out fair and equitable
trade agreements.
I do not want to see this country slide
back into isolation, although there are
people in this great Nation of ours who
are advocating steps that would have
that very result.
I think the Senator from Montana
performed a real service, and I thank
the Senator from South Carolina ·for
yielding me time to say so.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
want to express my thanks to the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont
and to assure him .I appreciate what he
had to say. I agree with him. There is
much more I would like to say in view of
the interest generated, but I do not want
to intrude myself further on the generosity of the Senator from South Carolina.
I
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